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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 








Panel 22 – Acquisition and Logistics in Support of 
Disaster Relief and Homeland Security 
Thursday, May 12, 2011 
1:45 p.m. – 
3:15 p.m. 
Chair: Rear Admiral Kathleen Dussault, SC, USN, Director, Supply, 
Ordnance, & Logistics Operations Division, Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations 
Strategies for Logistics in Case of a Natural Disaster 
Keenan Yoho and Aruna Apte, NPS 
An Analysis of U.S. Navy Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
Operations (MBA Student Report) 
LT Cullen Greenfield and LT Cameron Ingram, USN 
Financing Naval Support for Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster 
Response: A Cost Analysis and Planning Model (MBA Student Report) 
LCDR Stephen Ures, USN 
When Disaster Strikes: Is Logistics and Contracting Support Ready? 
Aruna Apte and E. Cory Yoder, NPS 
Rear Admiral Kathleen Dussault—Director, Supply, Ordnance and Logistics Operations Division 
(OPNAV N41). Rear Admiral Kathleen Dussault assumed duties as the director of Supply, Ordnance 
and Logistics Operations in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV N41) in March 2009. 
Dussault comes to OPNAV from her most recent assignment as commander of the Joint Contracting 
Command Iraq/Afghanistan, headquartered in Baghdad, Iraq, with 18 regional offices throughout both 
theaters. 
Dussault graduated from the University of Virginia in 1977 with a Bachelor of Arts in American 
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USS Point Loma (AGDS-2) in the Pacific Area Launch Support Ship for the Trident missile program 
as supply officer, USS Concord (AFS-5) as the assistant supply officer during Operations Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm, and as supply officer aboard USS Seattle (AOE-3), where she served as 
Afloat Logistics coordinator while deployed to the 5th Fleet operating area. 
Dussault’s shore tours include assistant supply officer and disbursing officer to the Navy 
Communications Station, Nea Makri, Greece; Defense Contract Administration Services Region 
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procuring contracting officer for the Sidewinder and deputy for Missile Systems Acquisition at Naval 
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Dussault has earned a master's degree (with honors) in procurement management from Saint Mary's 
College in Moraga, CA, and a master's degree in national resource strategy from the Industrial 
College of the Armed Forces. She has achieved the highest levels of accreditation in Acquisition, 
Financial and Supply Chain Management and Joint Professional Military Education. Dussault is 
certified in production and inventory management through APICS, the educational society for 
resource management. She has completed the Executive Education Program at Columbia Business 
School. 
Her decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Navy 
Meritorious Service Medal with two gold stars, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Navy 
Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal with gold star and various unit citations, campaign 
medals and service medals.
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Abstract 
Recent crisis responses, including the Department of Defense (DoD) and the United 
States (U.S.) integrated response to the 7.0-magnitude earthquake in Haiti, in which 
the DoD played a major role, can be examined and analyzed to determine how 
greater efficiencies and effectiveness may be achieved. Specific examination and 
analysis of actual logistics and contract capability in real-world response, including 
the DoD’s ability to deliver the right mix of goods and services, when and where they 
are needed given limited resources, can be utilized to create a more robust capability 
for future events. This includes the ability to react more effectively and efficiently 
within the constraints of resources such as budget and manpower if contingency 
contracting is in place. We examine the planning and management of the DoD’s 
logistics and contracting support for contingency, expeditionary, and crisis response 
and provide specific recommendations for optimizing response capability for future 
crisis response. 
Introduction 
In the last few years, a substantial population of the world has suffered due to 
disasters, natural or manmade. In 2009, there were “335 natural disasters reported 
worldwide that killed 10,655 persons, affected more than 119 million others, and caused 
over $41.3 billion in economic damages” (Vos et al., 2010).  Recent crisis responses, 
including the DoD and U.S. integrated response to the 7.0-magnitude earthquake in Haiti, in 
which the DoD played a major role, can be examined and analyzed to determine how 
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greater efficiencies and effectiveness may be achieved. Currently, there exists a sub-
optimization of capability due to lack of integrated analytical approach creating and 
executing crisis response. This is manifest in long lead times and high costs in acquisition 
and delivery of critical supplies and services in areas devastated by disaster.  The negative 
effects of the inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of existing systems include but are not 
limited to loss of lives and property. 
The life cycle of a disaster can be divided into three stages along the time line 
(Figure 1): preparedness efforts before the disaster strikes, response immediately after the 
















Figure 1. Time Line of Humanitarian Supply Chain 
(Apte, 2009) 
When a disaster strikes, the response follows: donations and funding are solicited 
from donors, and sometimes supplies are obtained from pre-contracted vendors. Sometimes 
the supplies are obtained in advance, especially during the pre-positioning stages. The 
supplies received from donors and supplies purchased from vendors are then transported 
by various means to predetermined locations and distributed by emergency responders in 
the affected areas. The contracting for this transportation should also be predetermined for 
fast relief. However, the nature of the events creates uncertainties and, again, logistics and 
contracting have to create an efficient interface. The complexity of humanitarian logistics 
can be appreciated when the distribution process through this time line, along with the 
factors and characteristics of this supply chain, are taken into account.  
Specific examination and analysis of actual logistics and contract capability in real-
world response, including the DoD’s ability to deliver the right mix of goods and services, 
when and where they are needed given limited resources, can be utilized to create a more 
robust capability for future events. This includes the ability to react more effectively and 
efficiently within the constraints of resources such as budget and manpower if contingency 
contracting is in place. Humanitarian logistics is a critical element of an effective and efficient 
disaster relief process (Apte 2009). 
Recent and current examination of DoD crisis response capability indicates that the 
overall supply chain can be improved (Lodree & Taskin, 2009). Specifically, the response 
time, coordination of providers, contracting, and the capability to deliver the right mix of 
goods and services can be enhanced.  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) REF 
indicates that coordination and planning efforts for domestic and international disasters must 
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be improved.  This call for improved coordination to improve response extends to the 
logistics and contracting support communities within the DoD, the Department of the Army 
(DA), and other services and can be a key enabler for initial response improvement.  
In Haiti, devastation caused by the earthquake dramatically impaired the capability of 
all rapid response efforts.  The resulting extreme conditions made it difficult to deliver and 
transport much needed equipment, materials, supplies, and services to the Haiti earthquake 
victims and the first responders on the scene. This study will look into how the planners and 
coordinators utilized DoD contracting and logistics to provide relief to those in Haiti.  
Additionally, a comparative analysis of recent DoD humanitarian assistance operations will 
disclose best practices in DoD disaster relief as this study uncovers what went right, what 
went wrong, and what was learned in the first 100 hours of the Haiti Relief Effort. 
In the immediate response phase, the demands of a disaster require an immediate 
response, and in order to do so, supply chains need to be designed and deployed at once, 
even though the knowledge of the situation is limited.  Relief agencies should react with very 
little knowledge of the situation, and therefore, supply chains and logisticians need to be 
flexible and adaptable.  Distribution is the most difficult situation, according to the authors.  
Getting the supplies where they need to be within the affected region is very difficult, and 
most of the time, these supplies are needed quickly.  Distribution networks must be flexible, 
and this will require an adaptive coordination strategy between the various relief agencies.  
Decentralization is imperative in order to facilitate this flexibility (Kovács & Spens, 2007).  
Decentralized networks are more adaptive to the unpredictable effects caused by a disaster; 
they are less rigid and can be implemented in an area with a lot of unknowns. 
Logistics is crucial to the planning stage of disaster relief.  Strategic plans should 
incorporate logistics in order to ensure that the appropriate supplies and provisions are 
available and properly distributed.  Many items needed in a disaster zone are well known 
and could easily be planned for.  Many relief agencies tend to have purchasing agreements 
with companies that provide many of these disaster relief supplies.  However, the gap is 
within the coordination between the capabilities of logistics agencies and the contracting 
community.  
When disaster strikes, is logistics and contracting support ready? Such a question 
can only be answered if planning and management of the DoD’s contracting and logistics for 
optimizing crisis response capability is studied. Further questions that need to be answered 
include the following: How can initial response time be improved? What will guarantee 
smooth supply of critical supplies and services? Are existing contracts in place? If not, can 
and should they be negotiated? 
Literature Review 
Academic Literature 
In light of recent high profile disasters, humanitarian groups and governments have 
shown a simple lack of preparation in combating the effects of the disaster (McCoy, 2008).  
Logistical obstacles have created greater suffering and highlighted the ineffectiveness 
caused by a lack of preparedness.  Humanitarian groups have shown a complete lack in 
inter-organizational coordination and communication; due to the enormous effects caused 
by disasters, these groups must coordinate their efforts in order to achieve the greatest 
effect.  Sometimes lack of coordination causes further problems where certain areas 
become overserviced and other areas are underserviced.  Information and responsibilities of 
 =
=




participants may be redundant.  As knowledge management systems are created, surplus 
operation can be eliminated and response efficiency improved. 
Logisticians play a vital role in almost all aspects of society, and especially so in 
disaster relief zones (Thomas, 2003).  Logistics is the life of any emergency aid operation, 
and without it, lives would be lost.  The role of logistics is sometimes overlooked or taken for 
granted in these zones.  Usually, logistics is where many relief operations struggle or even 
fail.  Proper coordination between agencies requires adequate preparation before a disaster, 
but the lack of specific logistician creates planning inadequacies.  Ultimately, humanitarian 
supply chains are very dynamic and complex, but only a few organizations place logistics 
high on their agenda.  Logistics is viewed as a support function and not a strategic function 
within these organizations.  Inadequate consideration leads to underfunding, which results in 
inferior logistics provided by the organization.  Often times, logisticians are even left out of 
the planning process and, therefore, resort to reactionary measures and support a constant 
state of “firefighting” during a crisis. For the logistics function to be a strategic asset, donors 
and leaders of these organizations must pay attention to it. 
Salmeron and Apte (2010) develop a two-stage stochastic optimization model to 
address shortcomings in current pre-disaster planning for humanitarian logistics. A key 
strategic issue is the pre-establishment of adequate capacity and resources that enable 
efficient relief operations. The optimization focuses on minimizing the expected number of 
casualties, so our model includes first-stage decisions to represent the expansion of 
resources such as warehouses, medical facilities with personnel, ramp spaces and shelters. 
Second-stage decisions concern the logistics of the problem, where allocated resources and 
contracted transportation assets are deployed to rescue critical population (in need of 
emergency evacuation), deliver required commodities to stay-back population and transport 
the transfer population displaced by the disaster. 
There are substantial differences between commercial logistics and humanitarian 
logistics. Humanitarian logistics need to have zero lead times, often involve high stakes, and 
must sometimes utilize unreliable information; many operations are often ad hoc; and there 
is varying levels of enabling technology (Beamon, 1999). This is due to the unpredictable 
nature of humanitarian logistics. Logistics must be adaptive and flexible when operating in a 
disaster area, unlike the familiarity of commercial logistics. 
The idea that private sector logistics can and should be applied to improve the 
performance of disaster logistics, but that before embarking on this, the private sector needs 
to understand the core capabilities of humanitarian logistics (Van Wassenhove, 2006).  With 
this in mind, this paper walks us through the complexities of managing supply chains in 
emergency relief operations, as well as the possibilities of getting involved through corporate 
social responsibility. It also outlines strategies for better preparedness and the need for 
supply chains to be agile, adaptable, and aligned—a core competency of many 
humanitarian organizations involved in disaster relief and an area that the private sector 
could draw on to improve their own competitive edge. 
The speed of humanitarian aid after a disaster depends “on the ability of logisticians 
to procure, transport, and receive supplies at the site of humanitarian relief effort” (Kovács & 
Spens, 2007).  The authors created a framework that distinguishes between the actors, 
phases, and logistical processes of disaster relief.  The authors also defined humanitarian 
logistics as the different operations at different times that occur to aid and help those 
affected by various catastrophes, which could be broken down into two fundamental parts: 
continuous aid work and disaster relief. 
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Furthermore, they defined disaster management as a process of several stages in 
order to implement humanitarian logistics.  These stages include the following: preparing for 
the disaster, immediate disaster response, and reconstruction.  In the preparing phase, the 
authors make the argument that while preventing and predicting disasters are nearly 
impossible, thus creating planning difficulty. Disasters are unpredictable with the exception 
of possible manmade disasters (e.g., war, terrorism, etc.); however, sufficient preparation 
can be made due to the likelihood of a disaster , such as preparing for earthquakes in fault 
zones, preparing for volcanic activity in cities near volcanoes, or preparing for hurricanes in 
hurricane-prone regions.  Although the disaster itself cannot be predicted, the odds can be 
weighed.  Preparedness has been crucial in many of these areas, and the lack of 
preparedness is evident in those areas not prepared.  During their literature review, Kovács 
and Spens (2007) determined that a significant portion of planning for disasters lacked 
foresight into logistics and simply focused on reactionary measures such as evacuation 
routes. 
The main operational problem that exists relates to distribution.  Balcik, Beamon, and 
Smilowitz (2008) made the argument for a centralized distribution system consisting of 
various nodes spread across networks implemented within the affected region.  This 
network would aid in coordination by providing a systematic model of organization for aid 
distribution utilizing a centralized system.  Problems arise during a disaster, with many 
affecting the infrastructure within an area that oftentimes would be dependent upon during 
times of need.  However, with a lack of such infrastructure, a new solution to move disaster 
relief supplies around the region would be needed.  For the most part, the physical delivery 
of aid is a non-factor due to the ability to airdrop to even the most remote areas.  However, 
the planning and coordination of the distribution of these supplies is a problem due to the 
sheer volume and number of relief agencies that may respond to a region.  There are 
several factors and variables that must be taken into account that determine the means and 
methods of delivery. Thus, a flexible and adaptive plan is required utilizing various mean of 
tracking and routing.  However, the problem with a centralized planning and coordination 
system is whether or not one will gain participation among the various actors within the 
region.  Centralization depends on factors that are interrelated. Therefore, if certain parts of 
the distribution fail, there exists a possibility that the entire plan may collapse. 
Balick and Beamon (2008) created a model of a centralized distribution system for 
humanitarian relief operations.  A centralized system would generalize the overall disaster 
and be completely contrary to the very nature of most disasters.  If a centralized distribution 
system could be implemented, it would solve a majority of the problems associated with 
logistics within a disaster area.  However, due to the complex nature and lack of information 
pertaining to the disaster, it is incredibly difficult to implement such a plan.  Ad hoc networks 
combined with proper pre-planning would achieve the necessary flexibility in order to 
logistically respond to a natural disaster.  Unlike traditional commercial chains with pre-
established logistical operations and can regularly are planned well in advance; 
humanitarian networks do not have this luxury.   
Numerous case studies point out the importance of logistics as well as criticality of 
coordination among agencies that are downstream or upstream from the logistics in the 
entire supply chain. A 7.9-magnitude earthquake struck Gujarat, India, during a holiday in 
2001. This earthquake was massive and widespread; the regions lack of codes and general 
unpreparedness for the earthquake caused more damage than was necessary.  The 
earthquake’s scale made implementation of any logistics plan difficult.  There was significant 
use of an “IPT-like” team consisting of engineers, sanitation experts, earthquake specialists, 
and health experts set up to assess the damage and needs of the resulting humanitarian 
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mission (Samii, Van Wassenhove, Kumar, & Becerra-Fernandez, 2002).  This is an 
excellent model due to the varying levels of certain disasters; it is imperative to have a group 
of knowledgeable experts to provide real data to the relief organizations in order to 
implement the correct actions for the distribution of aid.  
Samii et al. (2002) stress the importance of logistics.  The logistics unit for this 
disaster had recently gone through a conversion.  They were well-organized and versed in 
all aspects of logistics, including not only purchasing but also warehousing, supply chaining, 
management, and reporting.  They also had two separate groups, which divided logistics 
between field activity and resource management.  This seemed to work well.  Additionally 
they had specialists pertaining to planning, coordination, and reporting.  They also had a 
distribution specialist.  The Red Cross had focused on their disaster management capability.  
Over the years, the IRFC had developed three main mechanisms and tools to respond to 
emergencies, which consisted of a funding mechanism, an assessment mechanism, and a 
mobilization mechanism.  All three mechanisms allowed the IRFC to raise funds, quantify a 
disaster area, and react by distributing aid.  The IRFC maintains a network of supplies 
throughout the world as well as numerous well-stocked donation centers in order to rapidly 
deploy resources in the event of a disaster. 
By the end of its six-month mandate in Afghanistan, the United Nation Joint Logistics 
Center (UNJLC), an interagency emergency response coordination mechanism 
administered by the World Food Program (WFP), had accomplished its goals (Samii & Van 
Wassenhove, 2003a). It had supported humanitarian logistics planners in their efforts 
throughout the 2001–2002 Afghan winter and addressed cross-border and in-theater logistic 
bottlenecks.  However, four months after the fall of the Taliban regime, the scale of the 
humanitarian crisis remained significant and the need for another year of operations was 
clear.  The UNJLC, which had never been deployed for longer than six months, was asked 
on an extraordinary basis to continue its operation for one more year. The UNJLC utilized a 
pre-planned strategy that consisted of three prongs involving pre-positioning of aid, ensuring 
corridor accessibility, and developing contingency airlift capacity.  The UNJLC took the 
entire potential factor within their region and developed an effective strategy to managing 
the crisis.  They concluded that corridor access was the most important.  They had to take 
into account the needs and constraints of the various regions and implement decisions 
based on transportation and pre-positioned stocks.  UNJLC also used innovative thinking 
when they employed locals to participate with clear access via snow-blocked passes.  This 
effort provided two factors for the people: cash and open access to relief aid and other types 
of communication and travel. 
Relief efforts were organized to combat the effects of a quick succession of floods in 
Mozambique (Samii & Van Wassenhove, 2003b).  The logistical constraints imposed by the 
floods made airlifts the only viable means of transportation.  It was also the most expensive 
method.  Given the great demand for air assets, there was a pressing need to enhance the 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the overall humanitarian relief effort.  But, which 
humanitarian UN agency or NGO was to coordinate the use of the available air assets? The 
UNJLC was made up of a group of humanitarian logistics expert who formed a sort of 
logistics “IPT,” and they were tasked with coordination and communication among the 
various aid agencies within the affected region.  They became the center point for all 
operations within the region.  This reduced the confusion and redundancy of multiple 








Recent disasters and the ability to effectively and efficiently respond has spawned 
several official published works related to disaster response.  Of note are those from the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the 
United Nations (UN), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the RAND 
Corporation, and U.S. military commands including the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). 
The RAND Corporation published a comprehensive, albeit interim, work on response 
capabilities and organizations responsible for response and recovery efforts. (Moore et al., 
2010).  The RAND Report Number TR-764 found that federal funding supports 
preparedness initiatives across cabinet departments as well as grants to states and certain 
major metropolitan areas.  At the local level, multiple agencies are grappling with a 
patchwork of federal funding streams and associated grant requirements.  The RAND study 
determined that despite clear recognition, most disasters occur locally—or at least start that 
way—and most attention to date seems to have been on “top-down” planning from the 
federal level, representing stovepipe initiatives from different federal agencies. With that in 
mind, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD[HA]) in the 
DoD saw an opportunity to strengthen local level disaster preparedness planning by military 
installations and their civilian counterparts—local governments and local health-care 
providers, especially the Department of Veterans Affairs.  The report examined the national 
policies for preparedness planning, examines preparedness utilizing a notional “risk-
informed, capability-based” planning framework, and examines local civil and military 
preparedness and local support networks.  RAND intends to continue research in this area 
in an effort to create and test a “concept of operations” for more coherent response 
capability.  The proposed model will be specifically tailored to U.S. domestic response 
capability, but, the lessons from the work may prove valuable in creating international 
response capability as well.  
Another RAND Corporation publication, Analysis of Risk Communication Strategies 
and Approaches with At- Risk Populations to Enhance Emergency Preparedness, 
Response, and Recovery, examines the key role of communication in preparedness and 
response (Meredith et al., 2008).  This published working paper represents results of a one-
year study and assessment that involved review of the literature on emergency 
preparedness risk communication and public health messaging strategies; the compilation 
of educational and outreach materials for emergency preparedness communication with at-
risk populations; and site visits in three states and the Washington, DC, area to identify gaps 
in the practice of risk communication with at- risk populations.  The study emphasizes that 
community involvement in preparedness and response, to include key stakeholders and the 
media, improves capability in pre-event, event, and post-event disaster response.   
The Government Accountability Office in March 2011 published “Measuring Disaster 
Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in Assessing National Capabilities,” a 
statement by William O. Jenkins Jr., Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues 
(GAO, 2011).  According to the testimony presented in the report, since 2002 Congress has 
appropriated over $34 billion for homeland security preparedness through grant programs to 
enhance the capabilities of state, territory, local, and tribal governments to prevent, protect 
against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and other disasters.  Additionally, 
Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-
Katrina Act) to address shortcomings in the preparation for and response to Hurricane 
Katrina that, among other things, gave FEMA responsibility for leading the nation in 
developing a national preparedness system. The Post-Katrina Act requires that FEMA 
develop a national preparedness system and assess preparedness capabilities—capabilities 
needed to respond effectively to disasters—to determine the nation’s preparedness 
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capability levels and the resources needed to achieve desired levels of capability.  Mr. 
Jenkins’ testimony states that in September 2007, the DHS issued the National 
Preparedness Guidelines that describe a national framework for capabilities-based 
preparedness as a systematic effort that includes sequential steps to first determine 
capability requirements and then assess current capability levels. According to the 
Guidelines, the results of this analysis provide a basis to identify, analyze, and choose 
options to address capability gaps and deficiencies, allocate funds, and assess and report 
the results. This proposed framework reflects critical practices we have identified for 
government performance and results. 
The report is significant in that it emphasizes the need to have measurable and 
demonstrable metrics to determine the state of preparedness and the capability to respond 
effectively and efficiently.  Figure 2 highlights the concept presented, indicating the response 
capability of local, state, and federal responses over time and the theoretical gaps that can 
occur. 
 
Figure 2. Capabilities Requirements and Gaps 
(GAO, 2011) 
The Government Accountability Office also published Hurricane Katrina: Planning for 
and Management of Federal Disaster Recovery Contracts, which presented the testimony of 
William T. Woods, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management, and specifically 
addressed the planning and conduct of contracting in relation to Hurricane Katrina (GAO, 
2006). The testimony report discussed how three agencies—the General Services 
Administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (the Corps)—conducted oversight of key contracts used in response to 
the hurricane.  The GAO found three primary and specific deficiencies.  First, there was 
inadequate planning and preparation in anticipating requirements for needed goods and 
services.  Second, there was a lack of clearly communicated responsibilities across 
agencies and jurisdictions to ensure effective outcomes.  And third, there were insufficient 
numbers and inadequate deployment of personnel to provide for effective contractor 
 =
=




oversight.  Mr. Woods recommended several actionable items to remedy the deficiencies, 
including but not limited to the need to have competitively awarded contracts in place prior 
to the event against which orders can be placed as needed and better pre-planning and 
communications with other agencies prior to the alignment of responsibilities among the key 
officials in managing the award and oversight of contracts.  This is but one of the many GAO 
published reports on the Hurricane Katrina response.  In total, there are well over a dozen 
reports, and most indicate a lack of planning, coordination, and communication as key 
problems in effective response capability. 
Recognizing the complexities of interagency communication and coordination of a 
wide array of agency and service cultures, the Department of Homeland Security published 
Risk Steering Committee DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010 Edition, dated September 2010 (DHS, 
2010).  Risk management and analysis supports specific homeland security missions and 
determines how homeland security functions can be best used to prevent, protect, mitigate, 
respond to, and recover from hazards to the Nation. The ability to communicate precise 
concepts and meanings is essential for effective risk-informed decision-making. Clear 
communication allows information to be used consistently to support decisions about the 
nature, cause, and severity of risks. This ability to communicate homeland security risk 
information with precision is critical to support decision-making at all levels throughout the 
DHS.  While this document is primarily geared for the DHS, it’s clear to the researchers that 
a universally recognized lexicon can prove beneficial to all agencies and services, 
particularly in communicating for logistics and contracting and developing sound business 
practices. 
The Department of the Army and the U.S. Marine Corps’ Field Manual 100-19 
Domestic Support Operations (DA & USMC, 1993) is a primary document in the force 
structure, planning, and conduct of domestic operations, including disaster response 
capabilities on U.S. soil.  The manual includes comprehensive chapters on concepts of 
operations, roles and responsibilities, legal considerations, logistics and support operations, 
community assistance, and training and education in domestic support.  Its Chapter 5, 
entitled “Disasters and Domestic Emergencies,” is a comprehensive guide on interagency 
roles and responsibilities, stages of response, and associated capabilities.  According to the 
chapter summary, the Army and the DoD provide military support to civil authorities, 
especially in disaster assistance operations. The DoD is a supporting agency, providing 
military support to other lead federal agencies. The Secretary of the Army (SA) is the DoD’s 
executive agent, and the Director of Military Support, or DOMS, is the SA’s agent for 
disaster assistance support. In most cases, the Army will participate in disaster assistance 
operations as part of a DoD effort managed by the DOMS serving as a joint staff and 
commanded by a supported CINC.  The Army is committed to providing timely and effective 
disaster assistance support to other federal agencies and the American people (DA & 
USMC, 1993).  Despite being authored in 1993, the Army still utilizes this manual.  The 
researchers contend that since many changes have occurred in statutes and policies, 
including revisions to the Stafford Act, this publication should be revised to reflect those 
changes and to include recent recommendations on logistics and contracting as required. 
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has published several reports on 
disaster response and disaster assistance.  Of particular interest is the CRS report titled The 
Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance: Legal Issues. (Elsea & Mason, 2008).  Since 
the military is often called upon to provide logistic and contracting assistance in domestic 
disasters, the legal framework for the apportionment of active-duty military units is examined 
in relation to the Posse Comitatus Act and the Stafford Act.  While these statutes deal with 
the use of armed military personnel involved in security and peacekeeping in domestic 
 =
=




operations, the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and the lack of observed law and order in 
New Orleans, in particular, and under special provisions can allow the use of active duty 
military for response.  This report defined the legal framework in understandable language 
and is useful for any logistic and contract planner and executor. 
The Naval Postgraduate School, primarily through its Acquisition Research Program, 
has published several research studies and working papers of interest.  Of particular use for 
this research effort is Phase Zero Operations for Contingency and Expeditionary 
Contracting–Keys to Fully Integrating Contracting Into Operational Planning and Execution  
(Yoder, 2010).  This sponsored research paper, published in August 2010, demonstrated a 
synergy that may occur when personnel credentialed in accordance with the author’s 
recommendations are integrated into strategic operations planning and execution 
specifically for contract integration into all operations plans.  The author contended that 
when the right mixes of personnel, platforms, and protocols are in place and utilized prior to 
an actual humanitarian crisis event, in phase zero, activities can be much more prepared for 
response in the event of an actual crisis. 
The Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook, published by the Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy and the Air Force Logistics Management Agency, 
provides a solid and fundamental guide for all DoD practitioners for humanitarian and 
expeditionary operations.  In particular, Chapter 9, titled “Domestic and Overseas Disaster 
Response,” is wholly dedicated to the topic.  Within the text, the unique roles of various 
federal agencies, including FEMA and the DoD, are addressed.  The chapter also provides 
an overview of FAR Part 18 Emergency Acquisition Authorities.  Mr. Shay Assad, Director of 
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, endorsed this handbook for use in all DAU 
CON 234 Contingency Contracting courses and that delivery equivalent credential. 
Forward Direction for This Research Effort 
The researchers will continue to investigate and analyze information and data 
pursuant to providing solid findings, conclusions, and recommendations to further improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of logistics and contracting in responding to crisis.  
This effort will result in additional chapters to include the following: 
 Data collected 
o Response supply chain 
o Contingency contracting 
 Analysis 
o Deficiencies in each area 
o Gap between the two 
o How do we fix it? 
 Conclusion 
o Summary of what we did 
o Recommendation 
o Way forward 
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